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This paper explores the interrelationship between the New Zealand Accident 
Compensation Legislation (primarily the 1992 Act), Social Insurance and 
insurance law principles. 
Essentially the papers aim is to attempt to establish what the 1992 act is? 
An insurance scheme? Social insurance? Or some sort of hybrid? 
The paper will detail the history of the accident compensation legislation 
leading up to the 1992 act focusing on how the word "insurance" managed 
to appear in the title. It will then briefly consider the concept of "social 
insurance", and whether there are any defining characteristics in this to 
identify the accident compensation legislation. The last part of the paper will 
consider the general insurance law concepts, describing them briefly and 
comparing them with provisions in the 1992 act. 
The text of this paper (excluding the contents, footnotes and annexures) 
comprises approximately 11,000 words. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1881 Oliver Wendell Holmes, in a lecture on "Trespass and Negligence -
Principle and Policy" stated: 1 
"The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents , 
and distribute the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all its members . 
. . . State interference is an evil , where it cannot be shown to be a good . Universal 
insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished by private enterprise . 
. . . Unless my act is of a nature to threaten others, unless under the circumstances a 
prudent man would have foreseen the possibility of harm, it is no more justifiable to 
make me indemnify my neighbour against the consequences, than to make me do the 
same thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to insure him against 
lightning." 
Almost one hundred years on New Zealand has embraced the concept of a 
universal accident compensation scheme, which has been part of New 
Zealander's lives for over a generation. In that last twenty years or so from 
the passing of the first act in 1972, significant changes have taken place to 
which we now have the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance 
Act 1992. This took effect from 1 July 1992. It was passed amidst rising 
costs and a general dissatisfaction, especially from employers, on the way 
the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 2 ran the scheme. 
And after that one hundred years, the New Zealand Accident Compensation 
Scheme still has the same sort of criticism levelled at it as highlighted by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. First, that state involvement is evil; secondly, private 
insurance can do it cheaper and more efficiently and thirdly, why should a 
person indemnify his or her neighbour where no fault lies? 
The new act was, perhaps not surprisingly, met with suspicion largely due to 
the inclusion of the word "insurance" in its title. This had raised the spectre 
of "privatisation" which as we will see later may have been just what the 
Galvin Committee report in 1991 had intended . 
2 
Holmes OW "The Common Law" (Little , Brown & Co) 96 
ACC and the Corporation will be used interchangeably. 
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Essentially the purpose of this paper is to establish what exactly is the 1992 
Act by examining the interrelationship between the generally accepted 
concept of social insurance and general insurance law principles. Is the 
scheme an insurance scheme per se? Social insurance? A welfare measure? 
Or some sort of hybrid which contains a little of everything? To do this, this 
paper will examine what led up to the inclusion of the word "insurance" and 
why it was so important to be included. It is also curious as to what it 
means. To ascertain what indeed it did mean, this paper will explore the 
development and history of the accident compensation legislation in an 
attempt to gain some insight. The paper will discuss the concept of social 
insurance both in the wider context and in respect of the New Zealand 
legislation. It will also consider whether the present scheme has any 
identifying characteristics that it may have with conventional insurance law 
principles. Clearly this will lead on to the conclusion of just what sort of 
"accident insurance" scheme New Zealand has. 
11 THE NEW ZEALAND ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 
(i) General 
Every ten years, for the last 30 years or so New Zealand legislators have 
passed a major piece of legislation on accident compensation . The first of 
which had marked impact on the insurance industry. The latest in the line of 
Acts, as that noted above, is the Accident, Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Act 1992 (herein after referred to as the 1992 Act) . The aim of 
the most recent Act is: 
" .. . to establish an insurance-based scheme to rehabilitate and compensate in an 
equitable and financially affordable manner those persons who suffer personal injury ." 
The seeds of change appeared soon after the turn of the century with the 
introduction of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act 1928. 
The Attorney General, after introducing the legislation, expressed the hope 
that the scheme could eventually be extended to cover risks, irrespective of 
how the accident happened. In 1937 a Bill was drafted which would have 
gone some distance towards that goal in cases of motor accidents, though it 
would have left the common law rights unaffected. There was strenuous 
3 
opposition to the Bill and it was never introduced. The idea, however 
continued to simmer. 3 
In 1938, the fifth Dominion Law Conference resolved by a majority to 
approve the principle of absolute (ie no fault) liability for personal injuries in 
motor collision cases. 4 
Almost thirty years later in 1962, a committee was formed to report on the 
possibility and desirability of introducing some form of compensation scheme, 
based on absolute liability, for those injured or died in motor vehicle 
accidents. The general conclusion was that although impressed with the 
advantages of a comprehensive insurance scheme based on absolute liability, 
the committee considered it illogical and unacceptable to recommend a 
system for the victims of motor accidents when disability from other causes 
would be less adequately covered. A powerful dissenting opinion was 
presented by the committee chairman, the then Solicitor-General and later 
Chief Justice, Sir Richard Wild. 5 
Five years later, Justice Woodhouse (now Sir Owen Woodhouse), Messrs 
Bockett and Parson were commissioned to inquire and report "upon Workers 
Compensation". 
(ii) The Woodhouse Report 
The comprehensive accident compensation legislation genesis began with the 
1967 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry entitled "Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand" (herein after referred to as the Woodhouse 
Report). The evolution of the report had much to do with the replacement of 
workers compensation schemes and third party motor vehicle schemes as 
well as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963. 
Problems had arisen in the insurance industry after the amendment to the 
Workers Compensation legislation in 194 7 which gave the monopoly of all 
the workers compensation business to the state owned insurer, State 
Insurance. State Insurance was a competitor of the other companies in all 
the remaining areas of insurance business, and many considered that it was 
3 Fahy "Accident Compensation Coverage" 8th ed 1984 page 8 
4 Above n 3 page 8 
5 Above n 3 page 8 
4 
unfair that it should be put in the position of being able to attract the other 
types of insurance business away from the private insurers by reason of the 
fact that every employer in the country had "willy nilly" 6 become its 
customer. 
The Woodhouse report recommended a comprehensive compulsory accident 
compensation scheme on a similar basis to that recommended by Sir William 
Meredith in Canada in 1913. The scheme was to be based on the following 
five principles: -
• Community responsibility 
• Comprehensive entitlement 
• Complete rehabilitation 
• Real compensation 
• Administrative efficiency 
It was not surprising that the insurance industry had very little liking for the 
Woodhouse report or for the subsequent legislation. Even less surprising was 
what the opinion the Woodhouse report had about private insurers:7 
6 
7 
In the absence of personal liability and with the disappearance of any element of 
voluntary contribution there can be no place for the insurance companies . Their purpose 
is to seek business from individuals who might wish to cover themselves at their own 
choice in respect of personal contingencies of their own definitions . 
It is said that the State should hesitate before interfering with private enterprise in what 
is claimed to be a legitimate field of operation . There is much confusion of thought about 
this matter. Private enterprise cannot claim as of right to handle fund such as the 
compulsory road injury fund or workers' compensation fund in New Zealand. Those 
funds have arisen not because owners of vehicles or employers have been persuaded to 
provide the business, but because Parliament has ordained that they must do so . 
More over, the insurance system itself can offer no central impetus in the important areas 
of accident prevention and rehabilitation . It is operating in an area which ordinarily would 
be handled by the Central Government as a social service . It cannot avoid adversary 
problems. In terms of administration it is very expensive." 
Woodhouse "Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand" Report of the Royal 
commission of Inquiry December 1967 page 80 
Above n 6 page 1 81, 1 82 
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As seen by the statement above, the Woodhouse report expressed a disbelief 
that what they were proposing was an insurance scheme. After mentioning 
the other schemes - the Workers Compensation Scheme and Motor Vehicle 
(Third Party) the report stated :-8 
It is not an insurance scheme at all. It has always been treated as such in New Zealand, 
but in truth it is a compulsory and universal method of sharing one of the costs of social 
activity . The interpolation of private enterprise between the group of beneficiaries and 
the ordained fund has arisen simply because the contributions to the fund have been 
required and collected, not in the form of tax from employers as a general class , but as 
individuals in terms of individual risks." 
After the Woodhouse Commission reported, the Government of the day put in 
motion what was to become the Accident Compensation Act 1972 (herein 
after referred to as the 1972 Act). 
(iii) The 1972 Act 
About two months before the legislation was introduced into Parliament in 
1971, a senior officer in one of the largest New Zealand insurance business , 
the Prudential Insurance Office, hinted that his company might not take part 
in the scheme as agent for the Accident Compensation Commission: 9 
"We don't like Government agencies coming into insurance . We feel we should be able 
to produce all the insurance cover the public requires." 
The insurance industry was most incredulous that a National Government 
would introduce such a scheme and had not contemplated being locked out 
of the personal injury market. They continued with this attitude when after 
the Government announced the recommendations of the Gair Committee, one 
industry spokesman stated: 10 
"The industry cannot help but believe that the Government will give appropriate 
consideration . . . to the wisdom of replacing insurance companies by bureaucratic 
control .. before making a final decision ." 
8 Above n 6 page 44 
9 Palmer "Compensation For Incapacity" (Oxford University Press 1979) p 119 1 0 Above n 9 page 11 8 
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The Government of the day took a seemingly indifferent attitude to the plight 
of insurers, perhaps as Sir Geoffrey Palmer pointed out, this stemmed from 
the fact that the insurance industry never made any direct submissions 
indicating that they could help in the event of the Royal Commission's 
scheme going ahead. They tended to lobby the Government MP's privately, 
without any cohesion throughout the industry: 11 
"Members of the industry were in competition with one another and they did not want to 
reveal to each other the state of their reserves or the extent of premium cutting .... That 
inability to make a common response became a familiar feature of the insurance 
industry's behaviour in Australia ." 
The legislation went ahead and in 1972 the First Accident Compensation Act 
was passed. Its aim: 
"An Act to make provision for safety and the prevention of accidents; for the 
rehabilitation and compensation of persons who suffer personal injury by accident in 
respect of which they have cover under this Act; for the compensation of certain 
dependants of those persons where death results from the injury; and for the abolition as 
far as practicable of actions for damages arising directly or indirectly out of personal 
injury by accident and death resulting therefrom and certain other actions ." 
This Act revolutionised the concept of accident compensation through out 
the industrialised World, as it not only covered work and motor vehicle 
accidents but it covered accidents in the home, on the sports field and later 
introduced the concept of medical misadventure. All New Zealanders were 
covered by the scheme whilst in New Zealand whether they directly paid into 
the scheme or not. Interestingly there was no mention of the word 
"insurance" although as it was seen as an extension of the Berridge report 
that came out of England and many throughout the world saw it as "social 
insurance". 
The scheme came into force on 1 April 1974 and as noted applied to all 
those who suffered personal injury by accident after this date. It also took 
over the functions of the Workers Compensation and Criminal injuries 
Compensation legislation. Initially the scheme was run by a Commission, and 
State Insurance continued to deliver the service. 
11 Above n 9 page 353 
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Ten years on the legislators once again reviewed the legislation. 
(iv) The 1982 Act 
The aim of the Accident Compensation Act 1982 (herein after referred to as 
the 1982 Act) was simple. It was an act to consolidate and amend the 1972 
Act and amendments. Again there was no mention of the word "insurance". 
There was little if any fundamental change from the earlier act. The 
Commission had earlier, by amendment in 1981 become a Corporation and its 
functions were carried out by a Corporation with a Board and Chairperson 
rather than State Insurance. The 1982 Act also increased lump sums by 
$10,000, although there was much discussion about getting rid of the lump 
sums. The early 1980's were relatively quiet in respect of the scheme. 
There was however some rumblings of discontent in the mid 1980's on two 
distinct fronts. Employers were concerned with the excalating costs and 
what appeared to be indiscriminate decision making. Contrary to this some 
felt that legislation had a very narrow focus. They wanted to extend the 
scheme to include "sickness". This was something the then Labour 
Government was keen to see. During this time the Law Commission became 
involved. 
(v) The Law Commission Report 
The Law Commission produced a report in 1988 on the accident 
compensation scheme entitled "Personal Injury: Prevention and Recovery." 
The Commission was asked to report largely due to the disquiet being 
expressed about the scheme's administration. The scheme, for example had 
made in 1986, a large and sudden demand for levy from employers. It would 
appear that in 1985 the scheme was virtually bankrupt. 
The Law Commission tracked the scheme history, but was quick to point out 
in its summary at the beginning of the report that this: -12 
"scheme [ was) not in any sense an insurance scheme ." 
12 Law Commission "Personal Injury : Prevention and Recovery" Report No 2 1988 page x 
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"Its benefits" stated the Law Commission were: 13 
" .. . provided as of right and without reference to causes and regardless of risk ." 
It saw the scheme as an extension of the social welfare provisions of the 
country. 
The Commission did however temper this slightly in the body of its report and 
instead found that the scheme was not an insurance in the "conventional" 
sense but:- 14 
"Quite properly it can be regarded and its performance judged as a part of our 
arrangements for citizen-wide social insurance" (their emphasis) 
Even later in the paper, the Law Commission stated: - 15 
It is not an insurance scheme, the essence of which is that the seller and buyer of 
insurance settle by voluntary agreement (perhaps within broad limits fixed by public law) 
their rights and duties as reflect in the benefits and premiums . The accident 
compensation scheme by contrast is about rights recognised in or conferred by the 
general law of the land . And to emphasise the taxation point the scheme is supported by 
levies and not by premiums." 
The Commission argued that as both the 1972 and 1982 Acts do not refer to 
"premiums" nor does the word "insurance" appear in either act, this can not 
be considered an insurance scheme. If they were wrong in this, the question 
they then asked that if the 1982 act was an insurance scheme, what is it 
that the payer is insuring against? There is no longer civil liability for 
personal injury. 
It did however highlight that something needed to be done. In 1991 the then 
National Government set up a Ministerial Working Party on "Accident 
Compensation Corporation and Incapacity" convened by Mr Bernie Galvin 
(herein after referred to as the Galvin Report). 
13 Above n 1 2 page X 
14 Above n 1 2 page 4 
1 5 Above n 1 2 page 71 
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(vi) The Galvin Report 
It was apparent from the outset that the Government intended radical 
changes to the scheme and that changes were likely to emit from this report. 
The terms of reference (annexed as Appendix A) were such that the very 
fundamentals of the accident compensation scheme were up for discussion. 
The principal recommendation of the report was that of an "insurance based 
scheme which [would] limit Government funding to targeting assistance to 
those who would otherwise find it financially burdensome to take out their 
own insurance cover. " 16 And further to those injury victims who under the 
proposals would move from receiving compensation from an insurer to 
receiving income support from the social security system. 
In terms of minimising the costs to society of an injury compensation system, 
the working party considered that a good theoretical case existed for 
proposing that the delivery and the administration of injury compensation 
insurance should be opened up to competing private sector insurers. 
However, the working party noted that empirical evidence did not clearly 
demonstrate greater efficiency from competition. 
The working party considered the advantages and disadvantages of allowing 
private sector insurer to compete in the injury compensation market with the 
ACC. On balance they favoured a multi-insurer approach to delivery over a 
sole-insurer approach. They did note that if the provision of injury 
compensation insurance was opened up to competition, then the two 
schemes would have to be fully funded. They also considered that self 
insurance (where a firm meets any injury compensation costs as they arise 
rather than purchasing cover from an insurance company) should be allowed 
if the firm could meet certain prudential requirements. 
The working party did identify two difficulties with this approach: 
• Some individuals might not be able to afford, or even obtain cover. 
• prudential regulation of insurers would need to be looked at . 
16 Ministerial Working Party on "The Accident Compensation Corporation and Incapacity" 
Report 1991 - Mr Galvin, convener page 2 
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The working party saw the role of the insurer as three fold: 
• to provide income compensation and health care insurance cover for 
employers and individuals . 
• to manage the provision of that cover in such a way that the costs of 
obtaining that cover reflected the likelihood of an injury occurring. 
• to operate in a way that was impartial, financially sustainable, prudent, 
and fair. 
They also saw the role of insurers to: 
• ensure that injured earners were rehabilitated as quickly as possible, in 
order that they could be moved off income compensation and returned to 
work. 
• act as gatekeepers (along with employers), making sure that claims under 
each of the separated schemes were genuine. 
• negotiate with medical practitioners over the health status of injured 
individuals who had been receiving rehabilitation and discussing whether 
they were fit to return to work. 
• maintain databases in order to monitor injury trends and costs in various 
industries. 
As will be seen some but not all of the recommendations of the Galvin report 
were carried over into the 1992 Act. The fundamental recommendation -
that accident compensation be open to multi -insurers was not accepted. 
ACC remains the "sole insurer". 
(vii) The 1992 Act 
This Act is markedly different from its predecessors although it still retains 
the underlying concept of twenty-four hour, no fault cover for all New 
Zealanders. It did however purport to introduce the concept of "insurance" 
and the term "levy" was dropped in favour of "premium" . It did not however 
go as far as the Galvin report recommended in that ACC remained as the sole 
"insurer". It is likely that this was due to the need for the scheme to be 
"fully funded" to remain on equal footing with any potential competitors. 
Private insurance schemes operate on a "fully funded" basis, however the 
decision was made many years ago to establish ACC as a "pay as you go" 
11 
scheme. There is however a prospect of limited compet1t1on in service 
delivery in the introduction of "exempt" employers in the 1992 act. 17 
Employers may be able to control and pay for their own work claims for a 
period of 12 months in exchange for a reduction in premium. This may see 
ACC and employers competing for services. It will also allow private insurers 
to develop a package in order to manage these claims on behalf of the 
employer. Experience rating has also been introduced for employers, this 
operates in much the same way as the "no claims bonus." 
The underlying basis however of the Law Commissions reasoning as to why 
the 1982 scheme was not in any sense the conventional insurance scheme -
that is that the premium is still mandatory to one "insurer", was not 
addressed in the 1992 Act. There is still no freedom of negotiation. And the 
premium is not based on "individual risk". 
It has become increasingly obvious in the last two years this new accident 
compensation scheme has suffered a crisis of identity between a fully fledged 
insurance scheme and a welfare measure. The term "social insurance" 
became the conventionally accepted term to describe the 1992 Act, as this is 
supposedly somewhere in the middle of insurance and welfare. It would 
appear that this concept "social insurance" was not discussed by the working 
party involved in the Galvin report. Essentially the Galvin report 
recommended a fully fledged insurance scheme with competition and freedom 
to negotiate, with the ACC being the "insurer of last resort" . 
So what is this social insurance? Is it valid for the 1992 scheme to be 
described as such? 
Ill SOCIAL INSURANCE 
(i) Definition 
It must be said from the outset that many of the definitions and descriptions 
of social insurance are of academic interest only. New Zealand does have a 
unique scheme and one which has possibly gone further than any other 
scheme in the world - generally due to its comprehensiveness and range of 
1 7 section 1 05 
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cover. New Zealand's scheme could be considered a hybrid. Nevertheless it 
does, as will be seen, have some elements of "social insurance". The 
Committee on Social Insurance Terminology of the American Risk and 
Insurance Association has defined social insurance thus: 18 
"A device for the pooling of risks by the transfer to an organisation , usually 
governmental, that is required by law to provide pecuniary or service benefits to or on 
behalf of covered persons upon the occurrence of certain predesignated losses under all 
of the following conditions: 
1 . Coverage is compulsory by law in virtually all instances. 
2. Except during a transition period following its introduction, eligibility for 
benefits is derived, in fact or in effect, from contributions having been made to 
the program by or in respect of the claimant or the person as to whom the 
claimant is a dependent: there is no requirement that the individual 
demonstrate inadequate financial resources, although a dependency status 
may need to be established . 
3. The method for determining the benefits is prescribed by law. 
4. The Benefits for any individual are not usually directly related to contributions 
made by or in respect of him but instead usually redistribute income so as to 
favour certain groups such as those with low former wages or a large number 
of dependents. 
5. There is a definite plan for financing the benefits that is designed to be 
adequate in terms of long-range considerations . 
6 . The cost is borne primarily by contributions which are usually made by 
covered persons, their employers, or both . 
7. The plan is administered or at least supervised by the government. 
8. The plan is not established by the government solely for its present or former 
employees ." 
Social insurance is based on the principle of "social solidarity" 19 and brings 
about a "maximum socialisation of risks" .20 Instead of imposing liability on 
one person, the burden (financial) and the consequences of the damage to 
18 Bulletin of the Commission on Insurance Terminology of the American Risk and Insurance 
Association, Vol 1 No 2 (May 1965) and Vol 2 . No .2 (July 1966) 
19 Miller "Should Social Insurance Pay Compensation for Pain and Suffering ( 1982) 31 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 550 page 552 
20 Above n 1 9 page 552 
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the person is distributed to the public at large. 21 
insurance is the:22 
Or broadly speaking 
Pooling of risks of fortuitous losses by transfer of such risks to insurers who agree to 
indemnify insureds for such losses, to provide other pecuniary benefits on their 
occurrence, or to render services connected with the risks ." 
(ii) History 
It would appear that the Germans were one of the first to introduce the 
concept of social insurance with the German Workmen's Compensation Act 
1884:-
it embodied the archetype of social insurance in our time for the injured and 
symbolises the birth of such insurance ." 
It essentially severed an area from the tort law into a unique new field of 
compensation for personal injury. Just as significantly it introduced liability 
insurance in respect of employers of major proportions in the form of 
compulsory insurance. Furthermore the injured person was no longer 
required to prove fault. 23 
The growth of such schemes continued throughout the 1900's with many 
evolving into universal systems of social protection which have been among 
t he central features of social development in the 20th Century. 24 
There is now possibly over 140 countries at present who have social 
insurance schemes of one form or another . Some, like the New Zealand 
scheme, no longer recognised the right of an insured injured person to file a 
complementary tort claim against a negligent tort feasor or wrongdoer 
Social insurance grew largely due to the inefficiencies of the tort based law. 
There was a strongly felt view that there was a need to "get rid of the 
21 Above n 1 9 page 552 
22 Above n 1 8 page 1 
23 There was however still a necessity to prove causal connection between the work and 
the injury. 
24 Social Insurance and Social Protection Report of the Director General - International 
Labour Conference 80th Session 1993 
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nuisance of litigation. " 25 The social costs of industrial injury should be met 
by the cheapest form of the comprehensive insurance. Negligence action 
was a form of lottery and in the case of industrial accidents it provided 
inconsistent solutions for less than one victim in every hundred. 26 The New 
Zealand Workers Compensation Act provided meagre compensation for 
workers, and only if their injury occurred at their work. The Social Security 
Act assisted with the pressing needs of those who remained, provided they 
could have met the means test. All others were left to fend for themselves. 27 
(iii) Conventional Insurance v Social Insurance 
Private insurance utilises the pooling technique for meeting risk. 28 The 
processes used to determine this is to take a large number of similar 
"exposure units" 29 and group them so that the insurance company can 
accurately predict the future losses. Although more difficult the social 
insurance actuary preforms the same task. 
Fortuitous loss is also another element that is familiar to both private and 
social insurance schemes as both deal with unforseen and unexpected losses 
which are outside the insured's control. Similar comments could be made in 
relation to risk transfer and indemnification. Other similarities include specific 
and complete descriptions of all conditions relating to coverage benefits, and 
financing. In the case of private insurers this takes the form of a contract or 
policy, in the case of social insurance this takes the form of legislation. Both 
are funded through premia. 
The major differences can be summarised :30 
SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Compulsory 
Minimum floor of income protection 
PRIVATE INSURANCE 
Voluntary 
Larger amounts available, 
depending on individual desires 
and ability to pay 
25 Above n 6 page 87 
26 Above n 6 page 1 9 
27 Above n 6 page 19 
28 Rejda "Social Insurance and Economic Security" 2nd Ed Prentice Hall Inc Englewood Cliffs 
New Jersey 1 984 page 36 
29 Above n 28 page 36 
30 Above n 28 page 40 
Emphasis on social adequacy 
element) 
Benefits prescribed by law that can be 
changed (statutory right) 
Government monopoly 
Costs difficult to predict 
Full funding not needed because of 
compulsory contributions from new 
entrants and because the program 
is assumed last indefinitely 
No underwriting 
Widespread difference of opinion 
regarding objectives and results 
Taxing power readily available to 
combat erosion by inflation . 
LS 
Emphasis on individual equity (Welfare 
(Insurance Element) 
Benefits established by legal 
contract (contractual right) 
Competition 
Costs more readily predicable 
Must operate on a fully funded 
basis without reliance on new 
entrants' contributions . 
Individual or group underwriting 
Opinions generally more uniform 
regarding objectives and results 
Greater vulnerability to inflation 
On first glance it would appear that the 1992 act shows all the hallmarks of 
being more in common with social insurance and it will be remembered that 
the Law Commission said of the 1982 act that it may be described as social 
insurance. However how close is the 1992 act to a conventional insurance 
scheme? To ascertain this requires a closer look at the act itself and how it 
compares with the principles of insurance law. 
IV INSURANCE LAW PRINCIPLES V 1992 ACT 
(i) General 
There can be no doubt as will be seen that the 1992 Act possesses some 
unique characteristics not normally found in conventional insurance At the 
same time, however, there are basic requirements that are not found in social 
insurance which are found in the private insurance market. One such basic 
criteria is a "contract or policy" 31 there are other features such as third party 
claims, breach of warranty, premiums, misrepresentation/non-disclosure, 
double insurance and wilfully self inflicted /suicide. These concepts will be 
discussed below, briefly defined and compared with the 1992 Act in terms of 
how it deals with these principles . 
31 This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
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(ii} Contract. 
The whole basis of insurance law is the presence of the contract. A contract 
which has three fundamental elements: 32 
• It must be a contract by which the insurer, in return for some 
consideration ie premium agrees to pay a sum of money or provide some 
benefit upon the happening of an specified event. 
• The event must involve some degree of uncertainty as to whether, or 
when it will happen. 
• The insured must have some interest in the outcome of the event. 
Taking the 1992 Act as a whole, it could not be said that by any stretch of 
the imagination there exists a contract between ACC and its premium payers. 
Whereas the 1992 Act does all the above it is not embodied in a policy or a 
contract. Does this however defeat the concept that ACC is an insurance? 
There is some support that it might be in the "business of insurance" which 
has been described as: 33 
"Device which furnishes protection against a risk of loss by distributing the losses of the 
few among the many who are subject to the same risk." 
B v Cohen Exparte Motor Accidents lnsurance34 may provide a guide. The 
Motor Accidents Insurance Board ("the Board") was under a statutory 
obligation to provide public liability insurance to owners and drivers of motor 
vehicles. They were to provide fixed benefits to persons injured as a result of 
motor vehicles accidents. Drivers were under a statutory obligation to pay 
periodic amounts (premium) in return for cover. The Board's liability however 
was not conditional upon payment of the premium. 35 The Board sought to 
make an order nisi for a writ of prohibition against the Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission ("the Commission") and the Australian Insurance 
32 Prudential Insurance Co v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [ 1904) 2 K 8 652 33 Fleck "Reasonable Expectations: Insurers Dilemma 24 Drake Law Review 853 at 856 34 (1979)141 CLR 577 See also Booth v Police Benefit Fund Board (1931) WALR 48 35 Above n 34 page 587 "It is true that this obligation is not strictly conditioned upon the payment of a "premium" under Pt V of the Act." 
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Employees' Union ("the Union"), restraining them from proceeding with a 
hearing of an "industrial dispute". 
A situation arose when the employees of the Board served a number of 
claims on their employer via the Union. The Union's eligibility criteria 
provided that its members should be employed in the "business of 
insurance". The Board argued that its employees were not "in the business 
of insurance" and as such they could not in fact be members of the Union. 
Therefore there was no "industrial dispute". Mason J disagreed. He found 
that the Board's obligation was in the nature of insurance not withstanding 
the fact there was no contract. 36 Mason J stated :37 
"The expression is, in such a context, no doubt intended to have a wide meaning and it 
should be interpreted and applied in accordance with its ordinary and popular denotation 
rather than with some narrow or formal construction . Thus the question is whether, as a 
matter of ordinary usage, the Board can properly be said to be in the "business of 
insurance"." 
Mason J answered that in the affirmative and explained that as the Board 
was obliged to indemnify a person owning or using a motor vehicle " ... in 
respect of a common law liability incurred by him in respect of the death of, 
or bodily injury to, any person caused by or arising out of the use of that 
motor vehicle in Tasmania ... " carried on the "business of insurance". 
Mason J also believed that the Board was engaged in the "business of 
insurance" as a "matter of legal analysis": 38 
" ... the nature of the obligation imposed upon the Board by Pt Ill of the [Motor Accidents 
(Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas)J is at least analogous to the nature of the 
obligation imposed upon the insurer under a third party insurance policy in the context of 
motor vehicle insurance." 
On the question of the contract, Mason J stated :39 
36 It was clear that the words "business of insurance" were construed in the context of the 
clause in the Trade Unions registered rules . 
37 Above n 34 page 587 
38 Above n 34 page 588 
39 Above n 34 page 588 
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"Despite the Board's contrary argument, I very much doubt whether the existence of a 
contract is of itself essential to the legal concept of "insurance" . There is much to be 
said for the view that it is the relationship of indemnity that exists between insurer and 
insured, rather than the source of that relationship, that is the essence of the concept of 
insurance, so that it matters not whether the relationship arises by statute or by 
contract." 
There was a contrary view expressed in the judgment, Barwick J stated: 
The business of insurance in its ordinary meaning involves, in my opinion , the selling of 
insurance, the carrying on of a commercial activity in engaging in indemnity contracts . 
One, of course engages in insurance when one enters into a contract of indemnity : the 
Board may therefore be said to be involved in the indemnity insurance . But the eligibility 
clause goes further than that . It requires , in my opinion , a commercial repetitive activity 
of selling indemnity contracts. The word "business" in the clause is not, in my opinion, 
equivalent to the word "activity." It carries the connotation of commercial activity of the 
indicated kind . 
The Board , for its part, is quite clearly not engaged in a commercial activity . It is 
administering a statutory scheme which in truth is designed to displace commercial 
activity in the field of car accident indemnity. It seems to me little to the point that in 
expressing that statutory scheme language is used which has been borrowed from the 
commercial field of insurance, such as "premium" and "indemnify" . The Board in no 
sense sells an indemnity contract; indeed it does not enter into any contract of 
indemnity . It issues no policy . So far as appears , it does not reinsure . 
Consequently, I have reached the conclusion that the Board is not carrying on the 
business of insurance and that its employees are not within the eligibility clause of the 
respondent industrial organisation." 
It is obvious that the Cohen case could be distinguished on its facts , 
however, notwithstanding the above contrary view, it may give a guide as to 
how the courts may treat 1992 act in the future. 
(iii) Third Party v First Party 
One of the distinctions between the 1992 Act and conventional insurance 
contacts is third and first party. With respect to the "first party" , this can be 
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disposed of fairly quickly. All owners of motor vehicles and drivers of motor 
vehicles 40 pay a premium into the motor vehicle fund. If they have a motor 
vehicle accident, their expenses or compensation is paid from the motor 
vehicle fund. A direct association. Similarly, an earner pays directly into an 
earner account and if they have a non-work, non motor vehicle accident, 41 
payment of compensation is paid directly from the earners account. Direct 
premium paid for direct compensation paid. The Galvin Committee did 
discuss "first party" in their report. 42 They were concerned that the first 
party, no fault regime "may not carry particularly strong incentives to take 
care with respect to others. " 43 The distinction here perhaps between 
conventional and the 1992 Act is that both the motor vehicle premium and 
the earner premium are set amounts and there are no distinctions between 
the individuals. For example earners pay 0.60c of premium for every $100 of 
earnings whether or not they participate in risky sports or activities such as 
bungy jumping. There is no distinction between age groups for the payment 
of motor vehicle premium as there are in conventional insurance. Although 
there is some distinction as to whether you drive a motor vehicle or ride a 
motor cycle. The latter pays a slightly higher premium. 44 
Nevertheless the difficultly arises where there are third party situations. The 
third party is a person who is not a party to the contract between insurer and 
insured, but has an interest in benefiting from that contract .45 The difficulty 
arises in insurance law as the position of the third party at common law is 
poor, being caught by the rule of privity of contract, that is no one may 
enforce all or part of a contract to which he or she is not a party. 46 The law 
in Australia, prior to the Insurance Contracts Act 1984(cth) was a little 
different. In Trident General Ins. Co . Ltd v McNiece Bro . Pty . Ltd 47 a 
workman who was injured, was able to obtain damages from the main 
contractor and able to enforce a liability policy between the main contractor 
and the company. This was in spite of the fact that he was not a party to 
the contract and had not provided any consideration. The Court of Appeal 
held that the action succeeded on the basis that at common law the 
40 All drivers pay 0.02c per litre of petrol 
4 1 That is where no vehicle is involved . 
42 Above n 16 
43 Above n 16 
44 Motor Vehicle Premium regulations 
45 Clarke M "The Law of Insurance Contracts (Lloyd's of London, Press London 1989) page 
87 
46 Above n 45 page 87 
47 (1988) 62 ALJ 508 
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beneficiary of an insurance contact can sue on the contract. This was on a 
slightly different ground that the New South Wales Supreme Court which 
held that the main contractor was acting as McNiece's agent in taking on the 
policy. 
In New Zealand the indemnity principle and privity of contract rule have given 
rise to problems in respect of third party cover. 48 
In some respects section 9 of the Law Reform Act 1936 (NZ) assists. 
Essentially a third party who has a loss due to the fault of another party (the 
insured) may in certain circumstances recover from the wrongdoer's insurer. 
The added burden however is that before the third party can have any rights 
by way of a charge against the insurer he or she must establish that the 
insurance money "is or may become payable in respect of the liability to her 
or him. " 49 Clearly the distinction between this and the 1992 act, is that the 
action of the wrongdoer, with the scheme being "no fault" is irrelevant to 
cover. For example third party situation exists in work accidents . Employers 
fund the employers account which pays for accidents that occur at work. 
There is no direct association between the employee who is injured and the 
fund. They become the beneficiaries of this fund when they have an 
accident. Furthermore they can claim from this account whether or not their 
accident was caused by the employers or their own negligence. In respect of 
the latter the definition of "arising out of employment" states that it will not 
be relevant if:-
"(a) The person may be acting in contravention of any Act or regulations applicable to the 
employment, or in contravention of any instructions, or in the absence of instructions; or 
(b) The person may be working under an illegal contract; or 
(c) The person may have indulged in or been the victim of misconduct, skylarking , 
negligence, or been a victim of any force of nature ." 
It is this that clearly makes the distinction between that of conventional 
insurance law and the 1992 Act. It is unlikely in a conventional insurance 
situation were the accident is caused by the employee's own negligence, that 
employee would legally have call on the employers liability insurance. 
48 Tarr and Kennedy "Insurance Law In New Zealand" (The Law Book Company 1992 2nd 
ed) page 41 
49 Above n 48 page 454 
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Similarly a pedestrian who is knocked over by a motor vehicle will claim from 
the motor vehicle account, although they will not have made a direct 
contribution to this fund, at least not for this accident. Again it is irrelevant 
that they, as the pedestrian may have been at fault. 
The working party involved in the Galvin report did discuss this issue. They 
advised that the working party did spend some time looking at the 
alternatives of requiring third party cover especially in regards to motor 
vehicle accidents. This was to be over and above the current scheme. They 
stated: -50 
We reluctantly concluded that third party liability would only lead to the insurer of an 
innocent victim seeking to recover "damages" from the negligent driver who had caused 
an accident; and this would amount (albeit by another means) to a return to the fault 
based system." 
Clearly if the 1992 act was a conventional insurance, the concept of "fault" 
would have to be reconsidered especially in light of third parties. 
(iv) Breach of Warranty 
A warranty in the insurance context, is a term of the contract of insurance 
which if breached, entitles the insurer to repudiate the contract. At common 
law the matter warranted need not be material51 to the risk and it was 
irrelevant that no causal link existed between the breach and the loss that 
occurred. 52 Tarr and Kennedy provide an example of this in Mackay v 
London General Insurance. 53 The insured omitted to advise the insurer when 
applying for a motor vehicle insurance that he had been fined several months 
previously for driving a motor cycle without sufficient brakes. Although Swift 
J found that this non-disclosure was not material, the insured had warranted 
50 Above n 1 6 page 30 
51 Section 6(2) of Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 states of materiality, inter alia : 
" ... a statement is material only if that statement would have influenced the 
judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or in determining whether 
[it] would have taken or continued the risk upon substantially the same terms ." 
The concept of materiality does have limited application to the ARCI Act . Although it 
does not relate to the fixing of a premium it does have significant as to whether ACC will 
continue to compensation , ie continue to carry the risk, of a claim . 
52 Above n 48 page 14 1 
53 (1935) 51 Li L Rep 201 
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that he had never been convicted. The insurer could rely on this breach of 
warranty however as a defence to a claim brought on the policy. 
The Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 (here in after referred to the ILR Act) 
does however go some way in restricting the circumstances in which policies 
can be avoided. It regulates the consequences that flow from failure of an 
insured to comply with a clause requiring notice of claims, and curtails the 
efficacy of non causative or temporal exclusions. Section 9 of the ILR Act 
states:-
"Time limits on claims under contracts of insurance - ( 1) A provision of a contract of 
insurance prescribing any manner in which or any limit of time within which notice of any 
claim by the insured under such contract must be given or prescribing any limit of time 
within which any suit or action by the insured must be brought shall-
(a) If that contract of insurance is embodied in a life policy and the claim, suit, or 
action relates to the death of the insured, not bind the insured; and 
(b) In any other case, bind the insured only if in the opinion of the arbitrator or court 
determining the claim the insurer has in the particular circumstances been so 
prejudiced by the failure of the insured to comply with such provision that it would 
be inequitable if such provision were not to bind the insured . 
(2) Where -
(a) The insured under any contract of insurance to which subsection (1 )(b) of this 
section applies fails to give notice of any claim in any manner or within any limit of 
time prescribed by the contract; and 
(b) The cost of repairing, replacing, or reinstating any property when it falls to be 
met is greater than that which would have applied if the notice had been given in the 
manner or within the time so prescribed, -
that greater cost shall not constitute prejudice to the insurer for the purposed of 
subsection ( 1 )(b) of this section, but the insurer shall not be obliged to apply or pay in 
repairing, replacing, or reinstating the property a greater sum than that for which he 
would have been liable if the notice of claim had been given in the manner or within the 
time so prescribed ." 
Or similarly with section 11 of the ILR Act: -
Certain exclusion forbidden - Where-
(a) By the provisions of a contract of insurance the circumstances in which the insurer is 
bound to indemnify the insured against loss are so defined as to exclude or limit the 
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liability of the insurer to indemnify the insured on the happening of certain events or on 
the existence of certain circumstances; and 
(b) In the view of the Court or arbitrator determining the claim of the insured the liability 
of the insurer has been so defined because the happening of such events or on the 
existence of such circumstances was in the view of the insurer likely to increase the risk 
of such loss occurring, -
the insured shall not be disentitled to be indemnified by the insurer by reason only of 
such provisions of the contract of insurance if the insured proves on the balance of 
probability that the loss in respect of which the insured seeks to be indemnified was not 
caused or contributed to by the happening of such events or the existence of such 
circumstances." 
Compare this with section 63(2) of the 1992 Act which requires a claimant to 
lodge a claim within 12 months "after the date on which personal injury is 
suffered" if payment is to be made. There is no discretion to allow a claim 
after the twelve month period. It is likely that had this been a term of a 
conventional insurance contract that pursuant to section 9 of the ILR act, it is 
very likely that a clause similar to section 63(2) would not be valid. It is 
interesting to compare section 63(2) with the earlier legislation which had a 
similar provision. Section 98(2) of the 1982 Act stated: -
(2) A failure to forward any such claim within the time specified in subsection ( 1) of this 
section shall be no bar to the claim if the corporation is of the opinion that it has not 
been prejudiced in the determination of the case by the failure, where in the making of 
inquires or otherwise, or that the failure was occasioned by mistake of fact, or by 
mistake of any matter of law other than the provisions of this section, or by say other 
reasonable cause ." 
The above subsection appears to be more in keeping with the provisions of 
the ILR Act. It is some what ironic that an act that purports to be less 
"insurance" orientated, appears to be more in keeping with some 
fundamental elements of insurance reform, than the one that purports to be 
an "insurance." 
Breach of warranty also has a direct correlation with Section 7(6) of the act. 
This also has relevance to "utmost duty of good faith" and "non-disclosure". 
Section 7(6) states: 
LAW LIBRARY 
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Notwithstanding anything in this section, no person shall be entitled to any treatment, 
service, rehabilitation, related transport, compensation , grant, or allowance in respect of 
personal injury caused by gradual process, disease, or infection arising out of and in the 
course of employment where that person ... represented himself or herself in writing to 
the employer before commencing employment, in response to a specific request for the 
information from the employer, as not -
a) Suffering or having suffered from that personal injury; or 
b) Suffering or having suffered from a specified condition likely to materially 
contribute to that personal injury caused by gradual process, disease, or infection 
arising out of and in the course of employment . -
knowing that representation to be untrue ." 
Therefore if a person does not make such a disclosure to his or her 
prospective employers, the claim whilst will still be covered, there will be no 
entitlement under the Act. 
This leads on to the misrepresentation of claims 
(v) Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation and non disclosure are terms which have continued 
relevance through out the life of the claim as continuing evidence is required 
as to work ability or extent of the injury. Not only could this lead to the 
rejection of the claim but could result in prosecution. 
dissimilar to that of insurance law perse. 
(vi) Assignment/Subrogation 
Its thrust is not 
An assignment of a contract takes place when the liabilities imposed or the 
rights acquired, are transferred to a person who was not a party to the 
original contract. This may occur either by the act of the parties or by 
operation of law. 54 Assignment of a chose-in-action was not recognised at 
common law, however equity did recognise such an ass ignment . 55 An 
assignment requires an express agreement between the parties. Furthermore 
an insurer who becomes and assignee under a statutory assignment may sue 
54 Above n 48 page 4 7 
55 Kelly & Ball "Principles of Insurance Law In Australia and New Zealand " (Butterworths 
Sydney & Wellington 1992) page 483 
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in his/her/its own name. 56 An example of statutory assignment can be found 
in the Life Insurance Act 1908. This contains many provisions that relate to 
assignment of life policies, prescribing form and manner that the assignment 
is to take. It requires assignments to be by way of memorandum of transfer 
endorsed on the policy. 57 Clearly there is little or no problem in an 
assignment of conventional insurance contracts. 
Not so with the 1992 Act. Assignment is virtually contra-indicated except 
for a very limited number of exceptions. 58 All compensation, grants, or 
allowances are absolutely inalienable whether by way of or in accordance 
with sale, assignment, charge, or execution, bankruptcy, or otherwise .59 
Furthermore to strengthen this, the Act also requires, again with limited 
exceptions, 60 payments of compensation grant or allowance shall be paid to 
the claimant only . There are however two notable exceptions that requ ire 
further discussion. The first relates to independence allowance. Section 
87(3) states: 
"Nothing in subsection ( 1 ) of this section shall apply in respect of any independence 
allowance that is assigned to a company within the meaning of the Life Insurance Act 
1908 where that assignment is for a period of not more than five year ." 
This was placed in the 1992 Act at the eleventh hour to allow claimants to 
capitalise on their entitlement to independence allowance. However after the 
two years the 1992 Act has been in operation, no life insurance company has 
been able to offer a package to claimants. 61 The other exception is section 
15 of the 1992 Act. Section 15 leads on to subrogation. 
56 Above n 48 page 4 7 
57 section 43(1) Life Insurance Act 1908 
58 Sections 4 and 5 of the Maori Housing Act 1935; Section 87(1 )(b) , 88(3)(a) , 103, 104, 
105, 106, 106A, and 1068 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957; Sections 27Y and 71 
of the Social Security Act 1964; Section 400 of the Income Tax Act 1976; Sections 105, 
110, 118, 121 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980; Section 84F to 84M of the District 
Courts Act; The Child Support Act 1991 and Any right of the Corporation or exempt 
employer to recover any amounts under this Act or to make any deductions authorised by 
this Act from any Compensation, grant, or allowance payable under th is Act - section 
86(2) 
59 section 86 
60 Section 80 payment to children , Section 85 payment after death, and Section 87(3) 
Independence allowance . 
6 l The reason payment for independence allowance can only be made every quarter in 
advance . It can not pay the Insurance Company the five years entitlement to 
Independence in one lump sum . Insurance Company 's have not to date, prepared to take 
the risk that the person will be disabled or alive for the five years . 
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Subrogation is literally to "stand in the shoes" of an insured and to receive all 
the benefit of the rights and remedies which the insured may have against a 
third party in respect a loss. 62 Essentially as Tarr and Kennedy point out the 
doctrine of subrogation may be regarded as a remedy against unjust 
enrichment. 63 Put another way, it is used to ensure that the insured does not 
recover twice in respect of the same loss and therefore may not relate to 
contingency insurance, such as life insurance or in some cases personal 
accident insurance. 64 
Turning back to the 1992 Act, as already discussed the scheme is a "no 
fault" and there is no right to recover from a negligent wrongdoer. Therefore 
in normal circumstances subrogation does not have relevance to a scheme as 
there is no ability to sue to mitigate the financial loss of the personal injury. 
There is however limited subrogation in the 1992 Act where people have a 
remedy overseas. Where a person has a right to bring proceedings in New 
Zealand or elsewhere, the Corporation may require that person who has such 
a right to: -65 
"To take all reasonable steps to enforce the right; or 
To assign the right to, and do all other things necessary to enable the right to be 
enforced by, the Corporation within a reasonable period ." 
If that person or the Corporation receives money by way of damages, 
compensation, or settlement of that claim, the Corporation shall: -66 
"Deduct from the cost of the treatment, service, rehabilitation , or related transport or 
from the compensation , grant, or allowance payable , a sum equivalent to the net amount 
received by way of damages, compensation , or settlement; or 
Recover from the person as a debt due any amount that is in excess of the amount 
properly paid to the person, having regard to the provisions of th is subsection ." 
Therefore clearly limited subrogation allowable in a no-fault system. These 
claims generally relate to New Zealanders who have accidents overseas and 
62 Above n 48 page 237 
63 Above n 48 page 238 
64 As Tarr & Kennedy(Above n 48)point out where personal injury insurance policies are on 
an indemnity basis may in fact allow subrogation . 
65 Section 15(1 )(a) and (b) 
66 section 15 (3)(a) and (b) 
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are able to sue a negligent wrongdoer in that Country. Or people who are 
injured as a result of an overseas product - often in the medical area, Dalkon 
Shield, breast implants. 
Interestingly however nothing in section 15 will apply to any moneys paid in 
respect of a claim by the inured person under any insurance policy . Which 
leads on to the next topic - Double insurance. 
(vii) Double insurance 
As noted in the previous paragraph, payment of compensation under the 
1992 Act is paid regardless of whether a person is able to recover under and 
insurance policy. 
Double insurance exists where, at the same time of the loss, there is in 
existence two legally enforceable policies which cover the same interest. It is 
those components that are important - that is they must have the same 
subject matter, the same interest, the same risk and must be in force and 
legally binding. 67 There is nothing illegal about insuring twice over, but the 
principle here is that with respect to contracts of indemnity, an insured 
cannot recover more than the actual loss that he or she has sustained. The 
insurer who is called upon to pay out can call upon any others to contribute 
their share of the loss of the amount already paid under the first insurers 
policy. 
This was confirmed in Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v Drake 
lnsurance68 where two policies existed for the same risk, one insurance 
company was called to pay under the policy (the "first insurer"). It did so 
and then claimed on the second insurer to contribute 50%. The second 
company argued that as the policy holder had not claimed from them, there 
was no basis for the first insurer to seek a contribution from them. 
Rishworth J stated :-69 
"If that argument were to prevail it would ride horse and cart through the doctrine of 
contribution since in cases where contribution is sought, it is obviously going to be the 
case that the insured has not claimed against the insurer who has not yet paid ." 
67 Above n 48 Chapter 12 page 267 
68 ([1990) NZ Recent Law 113 
69 Above n 68 page 11 6 
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The 1992 Act does not recognise the doctrine of contribution. It does not 
have this type of luxury. As it is statutory bound to provide compensation in 
defined circumstances, it can not require a private insurer who has insured 
the same risk, such as income protection or medical insurance, to contribute 
to the cost. 
However the converse true. Many insurance policies require the policy holder 
to first seek payment from ACC and if this is not done then the policy is 
voided. For example private surgery. ACC is able to pay for private hospital 
costs as long as the claimant seeks prior approval. If they do not do this 
then ACC can not fund the procedure. Private insurers require their policy 
holders to go through this process with ACC. If they do not do so then the 
insurer will likewise decline their claim. Essentially the private insurer is using 
the Corporation to control the acceptance of the private insurers claims in 
ACC's role as funder of first resort. 
(viii) Suicide/Wilfully Self Inflicted 
One of the many comparisons between insurance law principles and the 1992 
Act is the provision relating to suicide/wilfully self inflicted injury. The 
principles between the two are very similar . 
The fundamental principle of insurance law is that an insured can not recover 
from a policy were the insured has by his or her own intentional act caused 
the loss or event upon which the insurance moneys were expressed to be 
payable. A common provision in accident policies is: 70 
"This policy does not cover death ... resulting from suicide or attempted suicide or 
intention self-injury, or from deliberate exposure to exceptional danger (except in an 
attempt to save a human life), or from an insured person's own criminal act, or sustained 
whilst the insured person is in a state of insanity ." 
Compare this with section 81 which states: -
Wilfully self-inflected personal injuries and suicide - ( 1) No compensation shall be payable 
or provided under this Act in respect of-
70 Evans "Suicides and Policies; Causing the Risk to Happen Under Insurance Contracts 
(1990) Val 21 Australian Business Law Review 410 at page 417 
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(a) personal injury that a person wilfully inflicts on himself or herself, or, with intent 
to injury himself or herself, causes to be inflicted upon himself or herself or death 
resulting therefrom; or 
(b) The death of any person where the death was due to suicide. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the entitlement of any person where the personal 
injury or suicide was the result of mental injury conduct of a kind described in section 
8(3) of this Act. " 71 
Clearly there are two distinctions between this and the insurance law 
principle - that is dangerous activity and when a claimant is suffering from a 
mental injury. However the general concepts are very much the same and 
operate in the same manner. 
(ix) Premium 
New Zealand's ACC scheme is funded by four main accounts - employers, 
earners, motor vehicles and government. 72 Every woman, child and man 
pays into the scheme in some way whether it be directly (earners, motor 
vehicle registration) or indirectly through government taxation and employers 
for their employees. Many have the expectation, that as an insurance 
scheme, if they are injured they will get a return for their "premium". 
However the calculation of premium does not operate on the same basis as a 
private insurer. A private insurer has the ability use mortality rates and 
individual circumstances to strike a premium rate . ACC however strikes a 
rate based on the incidences of accidents over the whole population and 
7 1 Section 8(3) states :-
"Cover under this Act shall also extend to personal injury that is mental or nervous shock 
suffered by a person as an outcome of any act of any person performed on , with, or in 
relation to the first person (but not on, with or in relation to any other person, being -
(a) An act that is within the description of any offence listed in the First Schedule to 
this Act; and 
(b) An act that was performed in New Zealand, or outside New Zealand where the 
person on, with , or in relation to whom the act was performed was ordinarily resident 
in New Zealand when the act was actually performed (even if the person is ordinarily 
resident in New Zealand on the date on which the personal injury is deemed to have 
been suffered) ." 
Note the First Schedule is attached as Append ix B 
72 There are two other accounts the subsequent injury account which crosses all other 
accounts and the medical misadventure account which has not and does not look like 
being utilities . No premium to date has been struck. 
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every earner pays the same premium, every motor vehicle owner pays the 
same premium and every employer in one of the 27 industrial classes pays 
the same premium. 73 The difference is between the Scheme and the private 
insurance is that premium payers ie All New Zealanders, theoretically at least, 
protect themselves against negligence claims. Another important difference 
is that cover under the ARCI Act is not dependant upon the payment of a 
premium. 74 
IV CONCLUSION 
Clearly this last part of the paper was perhaps a snapshot of some basic 
insurance law principles, but should leave the impression that the 1992 does 
have much in common with generally accepted insurance law principles. The 
1992 Act could eventually translate into a conventional insurance scheme 
with very little difficulty . The overall difficulty with this and the major 
difficulty is the unfunded liability the scheme carries. It is this that makes it 
so unattractive to private insurers. A further difficulty is the 
comprehensiveness of cover. Many private insurers would like to see the 
employers and motor vehicle fund divested to private enterprise but see no 
future in compensating those that are non-earners. For them say the private 
insurer, there should be a state funded scheme! Nevertheless insurance law 
principles would not have to move very far to accommodate such a scheme. 
Even given the above there is some legitimacy in calling the 1992 scheme a 
"social insurance" but equally it has some components that are normally seen 
in our welfare system. Clearly there are some philosophical problems that 
need to be sorted out before ACC can be pigeoned holed. Currently it seems 
the scheme is in limbo, trying to be all things to all people. Until this dilemma 
is discussed and resolved it will be almost impossible to label the scheme or 
to attempt to ascertain what its focus is. 
73 The 1 992 legislation introduced experience rating for employers . Effectively employers 
who show a good accident record could expect a "rebate" on the premium already paid . 
Conversely those that have a poor accident record will get a loading payable in the next 
financial year . 
74 Although ACC has the ability through its agents IRD to recover unpaid premium there is 
no question that a person injured either in or by an unregistered motor vehicle will not 
have cover . Further For example overseas visitors are covered while they are in New 
Zealand, they do not directly pay any premium although this group may indirectly pay 




TEMIS OF REFERENCE 
FOR THE l\1IN1STERIAL WORKING PARTY 
ON THE ACCIDENT COL',,IPENSATION CORPORATION AND 
INCAPACITY 
Policy Goal 
The basic goal of the Government is to ensure that, in the event of incapacity, everyone is eligible 
for an acceptable level of income support and has access to health care services on fair terms. 
Objectives 
Reforms of the Accident Compensation Corporation and of provisions for incapacity will be 
directed at re-designing policies and institutions to achieve the following objectives: 
(a) to ensure that, in the event of incapacity, everyone has access to an acceptable 
level of income support and to health care services; 
(b) to ensure that the costs of providing income support and health care services in 
the event of incapacity fall fairly among Government, employers, motorists and 
individuals; 
(c) to recognise the obligations on the Government that flow from the removal of the 
right to sue for personal injury by accident; 
(d) to recognise and foster the responsibility to take care of all those (employers, 
motorists and individuals) who are in a position to prevent accidents and other 
causes of incapacity; 
(e) to minimise the cost to society of the system of compensation for incapacity. This 
may require: 
i) greater freedom of choice among alternative insurers; 
ii) competition between public and private sector insurers; 
iii) minimising barriers to competition among insurers and ensuring that they 
compete on a neutral basis. 
Description of the Task 
The Working Party will : 
A. Identify and investigate options for defining the roles of the Government, motorists, 
employers, and individuals in the funding of income support and health care costs arising 
from incapacity. In investigating the options the Working Party will first address itself 
to these issues: 
ii 
i) is it desirable that funding for incapacity-related health care costs (ie those 
resulting from motor vehicle, work and other accidents, and from sickness) be 
provided through the same mechanism as funding for other health care costs, or 
are separate funding mechanisms desirable? 
ii) what forms of incapacity might be provided for by private insurers, and what 
forms (if any) are uninsurable and require that the Government establish special 
schemes to ensure access to income support and health care services? 
-· iii) where insurers might provide cover for income support and health care costs 
arising from incapacity so that an insurance-based approach is appropriate: 
• what should be the required minimum level of coverage against the costs 
of income support and health care arising from incapacity? 
• to what extent could individuals supplement the required minimum 
coverage? 
• how should the required minimum coverage be funded? 
• who should be able to act as an insurer and on what terms? 
iv) where there is a need for the Government to provide assistance so that a social 
welfare based approach is appropriate: 
what criteria should be used to determine eligibility for income support 
and assistance with health care costs in the event of incapacity? 
what pause-periods should apply before Government-funded assistance is 
available? 
what should be the level of Government funded benefits provided? 
to what extent should benefit levels be earnings-related, flat-rate or 
income-tested? 
(The Working Party will receive further instructions from Ministers once these 
issues are resolved.) 
B. Advise the Ministers on the options identified under A above, and recommend a preferred 
approach. 
C Develop an implementation plan for the option that Ministers prefer, specifying: 
i) required changes in legislation; 
ii) required changes in policy not involving changes in legislation; 
iii) mechanisms and institutions for the provision of policy advice, the administration 
of funding (including the targeting of Government assistance, if appropriate), the 
regulation of insurers and the provision of insurance services. 
iii 
The Working Party will coordinate its work with that of the Ministerial Task Force on the 
Funding and Provision of Health services, the Minister of Social Welfare's reviews of welfare 
benefits and systems and, as appropriate, the Change Team on Targeting Social Assistance, which 
will consider targeting across a number of areas. 
Responsibility and Reporting Arrangements 
The responsibility for the Working Party will lie with the Minister in Charge of the Accident 
Compensation Corporation and the Minister of Health. The Working Party will report directly 
to the Ministers. 
The Ministers will report on the work of the Working Pany to the Prime Ministerial Committee 
on the Reform of Social Assistance and thence to the Cabinet Strategy Committee. The Prime 
Ministerial Committee will ensure that the policy review and development activities being 
undertaken by Government are coordinated and consistent. 
Timetable 
• Appointment of the Working Pany - December 1990 
• Preliminary Recommendations to Cabinet Strategy Committee -March 1991 
• White Paper released - April 1991 
• Consultation - May 1991 
• Announcement of decisions - July 1991 
iv 
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